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l.'l THE SUPRE\IE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BLAINE BARNARD,

*

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
RUTH D. BARNARD and
P.'1.UL D. BARNARD,

*
*

Supreme Court

*

No. 19 08 0

*

Defendants and Respondents.

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

* * * * *
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for specific performance wherein
Plaintiff-Appellant sought enforcement of an oral contract
between Plaintiff-Appellant as buyer and Defendant-Respondent,
Ruth D. Barnard as seller of two acres of real estate located
in Box Elder County, Utah.
DISPOS lTION IN LOWER COURT
After non-jury trial on the merits, the trial court held
that the contract was unenforceable, and ordered DefendantRespondent, Ruth D. Barnard, to return the $6,000 purchase
price to Plaintiff-Appellant.

The trial court also declared

unenforccnhle a warranty deed from Defendant-Respondent, Ruth
U. llarnHrd, to Defendant-Respondent, Paul D. Barnard, and
quieted title to the property in favor of Defendant-Respondent,
l{utl1

iJ.

ilarnard.
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NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGIIT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks reversal of the trial court's
de t e rm i n at i on that
with

the con t r a c t was u n en f o r c ea b l e and r erna n d

instructions to find the eastern boundary of the real

estate to be conveyed and order specific performance of

the

contract.
STATE:.IENT OF FACTS
As of September 3,

1976,

Defendant-Respondent, Ruth D.

Barnard (hereinafter "Ruth") was the owner
absolute of

in fee simple

the tract of land (hereinafter "total

particularly described on APPENDIX A (R.

tract") more

On September 3,

82).

1 9 7 6 , Ru th executed a War ran t y Deed t o the tot a 1 t r a c t

of her son, Defendant-Respondent,
"Paul"), which deed was

Paul D. Barnard

1978, Ruth entered

1979 (R.

83,

into a contract

"the contract") with another son,
(hereinafter

Plaintiff-Appellant

"Blaine") whereby Ruth was to convey two acres

Blaine,

reserving a life estate in Ruth,

(R.

84).

On September

p u ch as e p r i c e t o Ru t h ( R.
Blaine a receipt for
1g7 9,

Ru th

25,

tract

to

in exchange for $6,000

1978 Blaine paid the $6,000

On Ap r i 1 .) ,

84) •

the $6,000

(R.

19).

19 7 9 ,

Pr i o r

t o

!{u t 11 :; a v e
\p

l'

i I

I ti ,

threatened to s e 1 1 the proper t v , and llu th and '\!

had a disagreement after ·Nl1icil l{ut:1

tenrlercd $ti,

who

I )11

refused

On

85).

(hereinafter

(hereinafter "the two acre parcel") of the total

83,

(hereinafter

in the nature of a testamentary

diposition and was not recorded until
September 25,

i n favor

to tender

(IL

84,

11).

\pr

I

''

·1

i ne

t" Ill "ne
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The relevant configuration of land and ownership at the
t i me o f the con t r a c t i s rough, as s e t f o r th i n AP PEND IX B
(R. 83,

Disposition, Appendix I).

The two

acre parcel was to border on Blaine's property, the Allen
property and the Church's north boundary (R. 84).
remaining boundaries,
indicated (R. 84).

The

specifically the east boundary, was not

In 1981, Blaine had a surveyor prepare a

legal description of two acres of land within the total tract,
which is contained on APPENDIX C, without consulting Ruth
( R.

8 5).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE 1WO ACRE PARCEL WAS SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED SO AS TO
RENDER THE CONTRACT ENFORCEABLE
The trial court, in it's capacity of finder of fact,
identified the tract of land out of which the two acre parcel
was to have been "carved" and at least three of the boundaries
of the parcel, but had specific difficulty in fixing the
eastern boundary of the land to be conveyed.

The question

presented is whether such identification of the subject parcel
as was made by the finder of fact was sufficient, as a matter
of law anrl equity, to support a decree of specific performance.
performance is an equitable remedy, and the
revir".l'i ng ('ourt may therefore exercise a broad scope of review

ilil

P.2cl

1:;7-1,

'."'l't rir''l1'tl1<'•?.

1377

(Utah,

1980).

In actions for specific

tl1e terms of the contract must be certain so that

APPELLAJ.Yf'S BRIEF
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can car r y out t he

i n t en t o f t he pa r t i es ,

bu t w i th

regard to the certainty of descriptions of real estate,
reasonable certainty is all that is required
and if the description of land is sufficiently
certain to enable the land to be located and
examined, it is sufficient to justify specific
performance of the contract."
71 Am Jur, Specific
Per f o rma nc e § 1 1 7 at 14 9.
This principle,

as applied to descriptions of

from the more comprehensive maxim "in equity that

land,

sterns

is certain

which can be made certain."
(Utah,

1980).

In the present case,

then,

if the two acre parcel can be

so i dent i f i e d a s t o be 1 o ca t e d and ex am i n e d ,
sufficiently certain to warrant

then i t

is

the remedy of specific

per f o rma nc e.

, 2 0 2 P • 2 d 7 1 4 ( Ut a h ,

In

considered the question of
the sale of
challenged.
up

t h i s Co u r t

the enforceability of a contract for

land .vilere the adequacy of the descrif)tion was
In holding that

in the old field,

reference to "certain leased land

now under fence above the Spring Branch

Ditch" was sufficiently definite to render
enforceable,

194 9 ) ,

the contract

this Court explained:

"The onlv reasonable rneans bv which a person can
describe-property located on a p1Jl1!1c domain, cinc1
which has never been surveyed, is hy referenee to
n at u al monument s .
The or i q; i n a I p" rt 1 es t ) t Ii<'
contract could not hctve desc1·1i"''i tl1e land bv 111ct•'.s
and hounds without going to till'
of runr1111c; a
1
survey . "
IJ
I'. d 7 I I a t 7 I ( l' t 1 1.
l 97 g) •

·d.
A. n

d

t he

0

n l

v <1 v

t 1-1 e

r· n Pt' r' t ·

( · ' 1 1i :

1'

I' I

)\' 1
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reference to which "corner" of the total tract the two acre
parcel was located in.

They apparently agreed upon the

Northwest corner as the trial court's findings pointed out by
finding boundaries of the two acres in the northwestern portion
of Ruth's property.
This Court held that a contract for the sale of a small
tract of land which was part of a larger tract was specifically
enforceable in spite of the lack of a legal description for the
sma 1 1 er "car v e d o u t " tr a c t i n
(Utah,

5 8 9 P. 2d 1 2 1 9

the parties entered into a contract

1979).

to sell and purchase forty acres of land, a description of
which was supposed to have been attached to the contract, and
additional ten acres on which two houses were located.

The

lower court received parol evidence but ruled that the contract
was unenforceable.

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded

with instructions to "decide what was the legal description of
the land included in the agreement to purchase."
P. 2 d 1 2 2 J.

589

The Sup re me Co u r t s tat e d that the 1 o cat i on of the

ten acres was clear,

that the location of a portion of the

forty acres was clear (all land on south of freeway except 40
a c re s o f fenced ground ) .
the

5 8 9 P. 2d 1 2 2 !.

Apparent 1 y ,

'.vas not informed as to the amount of acreage to be

conveveJ over and above what had been "clearly" identified, but
n0n<'th,,le''
1je :_; (._'

r i rt

J,,
:i: 1

1 ()

instructed the lower court to decide on the legal

n.

tl1c

1Hesent case, us

the seller was to

v,• ''<·1rv<'d out" of a large tract of land, a smaller parcel

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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The general location of the smaller parcel

within the tract was known to and understood by the parties,
even though the details of the boundaries were not described by
metes and bounds.

holding went further

in fixing

the location of land in that a portion of the forty acres of
land to be conveyed was not even generally fixed within the
larger tract.

In the present ease,

the location of the two

acres was generally fixed at the northwest portion of Ruth's
property.

In fact,

three boundaries were found by the Court in

the present ease.

ap p 1 i e d to the present ease and the c 1 o s e d ex am in at ion of the
facts

in each case, dictate a reversal of the trial court's

erroneous conclusion that the location of the tract to be
conveyed was too indefinite.

The two acres was sufficiently identified so as to sustain
a specific perfonnanee decree since the total acreHge to be
conveyed was specified,

the tract out of which the

WH'

to be "carved" was identified and the location of the proµcrtv
'Nithin the tract was generally fixed nnd speeif1c1illv loc:1tcd
as to three boundaries.

AP PELLA.NT' S BR! EF
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POINT II
-------SPECIFIC PERFOR:'.IANCE OF THE CONTRACT IS DICTATED UNDER
RULES OF EQUITY

Even if the identity of the land were uncertain or vague
or ambiguous,

the contract would be enforceable via specific

performance.

Ruth, by her words and actions, demonstrated her

understanding that a two acre parcel in the northwest corner of
her tract of land had been sold to Blaine, and Ruth should not
be allowed to avoid the consequences of her manifested intent
with regard to the contract on the basis of a claimed
deficiency in the contract.
The general rule in this regard is well expressed in 28 Am
Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver § 59 at 677:
"Estoppel
and retention,
the facts, of
he might have

is frequently based upon the acceptance
by one having knowledge or notice of
benefits from a transaction.
. which
rejected or contested."

In cases such as the present one:
"The estoppel is also appied
with a knowledge,
·
28 _-\m Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver§ 59 at 679 (emphasis added).
I ri

,

2 0 2 P • 2 d 7 I 4 ( Ut ah ,

194 9) , t he

Plaintiff (in position of vendor) asserted that the contract of
Si!le wns too ambi;;uous to be enforceable.

The Court struck

down tl1e Plaintiff's contentions, and while admitting that the
had "infirmities," ruled:
"\Ve have a written instrument which is attacked
bccRuse of uncertainties of ambiguities. We are of
t 11 c opinion that

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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To hold otherwise would permit the
statute of frauds to be used by him as a shield to
defeat what appears to be a just and equitable cause
against him."

In the present instance, the facts bear out a strong case
for

invocation of the equitable principle of estoppel against

Ruth with regard to the claimed insufficiency of description
the two acres.

01

Ruth agreed to sell _two acres and identified at

least the general location of the two acres within her larger
tract.

On the same day, she accepted $6,000 cash
She d i d not i n f o rm B1 a i n e at that t i me or there a f t er

that in 1976 she had executed and delivered to Paul a Warranty
Deed t o her en t i re t r a c t of 1 and ( St at eme n t o f Fa c t s ,
R.

17,

21).

a 1 so

In April of 1979, Ruth gave Blaine a written

receipt for the $5,000 purchase price.

Later that man th, Ruth

had a disagreement with Blaine, and on April 13,

the Warranty

Deed to Paul was finally recorded (Statement of Facts).

Even

after the suit had comnenced, Ruth referred to contract as one
she considered was binding on Blaine (R. 1 9) •

The course of

Ruth's conduct and actions clearly es top her from claiming the
description of the land to be too ambiguous so as t 0 be
enforceable.

To hold otherwise woulrl allow Ruth to keep the

full purchase price until she felt

it was convenient or

profitable for her to return it, while in the meantime,
Blaine to believe that he had

R

had been for a fee si1nple interest,

contract.
cnuld

If
l111v1'

t 11

lead i r
e ,; al c

1
' l'•'l1

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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expected to enter into the property and possess it inrnediately
after payment of the $6,000.

But since Ruth had sold only a

remainder interest, Blaine understood that he was not to
presently assume possession.

Blaine's inability to assume

possession facilitated Ruth's apparent objective to "play
favorites" among her children by failing to execute a deed to
Blaine.

A reversal of the trial court's ruling is the only

method by which Ruth can be prevented from profiting by her
inequitable conduct with respect to Blaine.

,

5 8 9 P • 2d

1219 ,

1 2 2 1 ( U t ah ,

As stated in
1979) :

"This Court takes judicial knowledge of the fact that
land values in the area have increased greatly since
the contract was made.
. . the seller
could hope for a mighty windfall by selling if at its
enhanced value to others."
(emphasis added)
Equity dictates that the contract be enforced against
Ruth, "lho accepted the ful 1 purchase price for the land, and in
favor of Blaine, who in good faith paid the price and believed
he had a contract.

There is no evidence on the record of any

dispute regarding the location and extent of the land to be
conveyed until Defendants filed their answer.
'il5 P.2d 427, 429 (Utah, 1980).

It is now asserted as a

convenient device to deprive Blaine of the benefit of his
bargai'l.

lcq u i t y s ho u l d no t to 1 er at e such an e f fort.
CONCLUSION

The trial court erred in holding that the contract in
inenforceable because l) the land to be conveyed was identified

1

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
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location within the tract and at least

three boundries, and 2) Ruth is estopped from asserting any
technical deficiency in the contract.

This Court should

therefore do equity by reversing the trial court's decision to
deny specific perfonnance and by remanding with instructions to
"decide what was the legal description of the land" in

, 5 8 9 P . 2 d 1 2 1 9 ( Ut a h , 1 9 7 9 .

a cc o rd a n c e w i t h

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 1983.

CERTIFICATE OF \!AILING
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of July, 1983,
mailed, postage prepaid two (2) copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S BRIEF to:
Da v i d B • Ha v a s

HAVAS AND HAVAS
Suite 216 Harrison Place
3293 Harrison Boulevard
Ogden, Utah 8-±403

-------------

Beginning at Northwest Corner of Northeast Quarter of
Section 2 T. 8 N. R. 2 W. SLM, thence South 268 feet,
thence South 70°07' E. 420 ft., more or less, to West
line of State Highway, thence North 32°1 1 East along
said line 625.6 feet, thence North 67°31 '40" West 566.56
feet, thence S. 23°28' W. l':i5.2 ft., th. N. 67°31'40"
w. 256.3
ft., th. s. 21°46'30" w. 485.6 ft., th. s.
69°45 1 15 11 E. 308.7 ft., th. N. 1°26' w. 261 ft to the pt.
of beg. EXCEPTING therefrom the following described
tracts:
Beg. at a pt. located N. 341.26 ft. and E. 195.68
ft. from SW cor. of SE quarter of said Sec. 2, said pt.
being on Grantor's N. property line, th. S. 23°28'
134.2 ft., th. S. 67°31'40" E. 40.0 ft., th. N. 23°28'
E. 134.2
to said N. line, th. N. 67°31'40" w. 40.0
ft. along said N. line to pt. of beg.
Beg. at a pt. which is 280 ft. N. and N. 67°31'40"
W. 95 ft., more or less, from SE cor. of SW quarter of
Sec. 35 T. 9 N. R. 2 W. SLM which pt. is on the E. line
of the County Road, and running th. S. 21°46'30" W. 95
ft., along said road; th. S. 67°31 '40" E. 185 ft., th.
N. 21°46 1 30 11 E. 95 ft., th. N. 67°31'40" W. 185 ft to pt.
of beg.
Beg. at a pt. N. 31°20 1 E. 245.6 ft. and N. 66°58'
W. 256.5 ft. from SW cor. of SE quarter of ,Sec. 35 T.
N. R. 2 W. SLM, th. N. 22°25' E. 21.0 ft., th. S. 66°58'
E. 201.0 ft., th. S. 21°46'30" W. 21.0 ft., th. N. 66°5,q•
W. 201.24 ft to the pt. of beg.
Beg. at a pt. S. 1°26' E. 261 ft. and N. 69°45'15"
W. 308.7 ft. from NW cor. of NE quarter of Sec. 2 T. 8
N.R. 2 W. SLM, an existing fence corner of record, said
point being s. 162.0 ft. and W. 2936.76 ft. from NE cor.
of said Sec. 2, thence N. 21°46'30" E. 390.6 ft., thence
S. 67°35'50 11 E. 345.4 ft., th. S. 23°18 1 15 11 W. 378.0
ft., th. N. 69°45'15" W. 335.41 ft to pt. of beg.
Beg. at a pt. N. 31°21' E. 245.6 ft. from SW corner
of SE quarter of Sec. 35 T. 9 N. R. 2 W. SLM, th. N.
24°02' E. 21 ft., thence N. 66°58' West 55.5 ft., thence
S. 22°25' W. 21 ft., th. S. 66°58' E. 55.26 ft. to the
pt.of beg.

rt:

Together with all water rights and improvements belonging
thereto.

QO)t

1

•
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'__,....__

-(ESS AND.CR SON GREGOR.' J;TlfL

1-\Ppl_- re/JI A
Part of the SE Quarter of Section 35, T9N, R2W
and part of the NE Quarter of Section 2, T8N,
R2W SLB&M, beginning at a point located 157.38
feet North and 47.92 feet East of the NW Corner of
NE Quarter of said Section 2, thence N21°46'30"E
71.22 feet, thence 567°31'40" E 64.43 feet, thence
N23°28'E 21.00 feet, thence S67°31'40"E 40.00 feet,
thence N23°28'E 134.2 feet to the grantor's North
line, thence S67°31 '40"E 346.79 feet, thence
S22°28'20"W 226.39 feet, thence N67°31'40"W 453.04
feet to the point of beginning, containing 2.0
acres.

(_,

